Various semantics for studying the square of opposition and the hexagon of opposition have been proposed recently. We interpret sentences by imprecise (set-valued) probability assessments on a finite sequence of conditional events. We introduce the acceptability of a sentence within coherence-based probability theory. We analyze the relations of the square and of the hexagon in terms of acceptability. Then, we show how to construct probabilistic versions of the square and of the hexagon of opposition by forming suitable tripartitions of the set of all coherent assessments. Finally, as an application, we present new versions of the square and of the hexagon involving generalized quantifiers.
Introduction
There is a long history of investigations on the square of opposition spanning over two millenia [4, 38] . A square of opposition represents logical key ✩ This is a substantially extended version of a paper ( [45] ) presented at SMPS 2016 (Soft Methods in Probability and Statistics 2016) conference held in Rome in September 12-14, 2016. relations among basic sentence types in a diagrammatic way. The basic sentence types, traditionally denoted by A (universal affirmative: "Every S is P "), E (universal negative: "No S is P "), I (particular affirmative: "Some S are P "), and O (particular negative: "Some S are not P "), constitute the corners of the square. The diagonals and the sides of the square of opposition are formed by the following logical relations among the basic sentence types: A and E are contraries (i.e., they cannot both be true), I and O are subcontraries (i.e., they cannot both be false), A and O as well as E and I are contradictories (i.e., they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false), I is a subaltern of A and O is a subaltern of E (i.e., A entails I and E entails O; for a visual representation see, e.g., Figure 3 below, and cover the probabilities for seeing the traditional square of opposition). In the early 1950ies, the square of opposition was expanded to the hexagon of opposition, by adding a sentence at the top and another one at the bottom of the square (see, e.g., Figure 5 ). Recently, the square of opposition as well as the hexagon of opposition and its extensions have been investigated from various semantic points of view (see, e.g., [3, 4, 11, 20, 21, 22, 28, 34, 35, 36] ). In this paper we present a probabilistic analysis of the square of opposition under coherence, introduce the hexagon of opposition under coherence, and study the semantics of basic key relations among quantified statements.
After preliminary notions (Section 2), we introduce, based on g-coherence, a (probabilistic) notion of sentences and their acceptability and show how to construct squares of opposition under coherence from suitable tripartitions (Section 3). Then, we present an application of our square to the study of generalized quantifiers (Section 4). In Section 5 we introduce the hexagon of opposition under coherence. Section 6 concludes the paper by some remarks on future work.
Preliminary Notions
The coherence-based approach to probability and to other uncertain measures has been adopted by many authors (see, e.g., [5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 24, 26, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44] ); we therefore recall only selected key features of coherence and its generalizations in this section. An event E is a two-valued logical entity which can be either true or false. The indicator of E is a two-valued numerical quantity which is 1, or 0, according to whether the event E is true, or false, respectively. We use the same symbols for events and their indicators. We denote by J the sure event (i.e., tautology or logical truth) and by K the impossible event (i.e., contradiction or logical falsehood). Moreover, given two events E and H, we denote by E^H (resp., E _ H) conjunction (resp., disjunction). To simplify notation, we will use the product EH to denote the conjunction E^H, which also denotes the indicator of E^H. We denote by s E the negation of E. Given two events E and H, with H ‰ K, the conditional event E|H is defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true if EH (i.e., E^H) is true, false if s EH is true, and indetermined (void) if H is false ( [19, p. 307] ). In terms of the betting metaphor, if you assess ppE|Hq " p, then you are willing to pay (resp., to receive) an amount p and to receive (resp., to pay) 1, or 0, or p, according to whether EH is true, or s EH is true, or s H is true (bet called off), respectively. For defining coherence, consider a real function p : F Ñ R, where F is an arbitrary family of conditional events. Consider a finite sub-family F n " pE 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n q Ď F , and the vector P n " pp 1 , . . . , p n q, where p i " ppE i |H i q , i " 1, . . . , n. We denote by H n the disjunction H 1 _¨¨¨_ H n . With the pair pF n , P n ) we associate the random gain G " ř n i"1 s i H i pE i´pi q, where s 1 , . . . , s n are n arbitrary real numbers. G represents the net gain of n transactions, where for each transaction its meaning is specified by the sign of s i (plus for buying or minus for selling) and its scaling is specified by the magnitude of s i . Denoting by G Hn the set of values of G restricted to H n , we recall Definition 1. The function p defined on F is called coherent if and only if, for every integer n, for every finite sub-family F n Ď F and for every s 1 , . . . , s n , it holds that: min G Hn ď 0 ď max G Hn .
We say that p is incoherent if and only if p is not coherent. As shown by Definition 1, a probability assessment is coherent if and only if, in any finite combination of n bets, it does not happen that the values in the set G Hn are all positive, or all negative (no Dutch Book). Moreover, coherence of ppE|Hq requires that ppE|Hq P r0, 1s for every E|H P F . If p on F is coherent, we call it a conditional probability on F (see, e.g., [1, 17, 47] ). Notice that, if p is coherent, then p also satisfies all the well known properties of finitely additive conditional probability (while the converse does not hold; see, e.g., [17, Example 13] or [23, Example 8] ). In what follows F will denote finite sequence of conditional events. Let F " pE 1 |H 1 , . . . , E n |H n q. We denote by P a (precise) probability assessment P " pp 1 , . . . , p n q on F , where p j " ppE j |H j q P r0, 1s, j " 1, . . . , n. Moreover, we denote by Π the set of all coherent precise assessments on F . We recall that when there are no logical relations among the events E 1 , H 1 , . . . , E n , H n involved in F , that is E 1 , H 1 , . . . , E n , H n are logically independent, then the set Π associated with F is the whole unit hypercube r0, 1s
n . If there are logical relations, then the set Π could be a strict subset of r0, 1s
n . As it is well known Π ‰ H; therefore, H ‰ Π Ď r0, 1s
n . If not stated otherwise, we do not make any assumptions concerning logical independence. Definition 2. An imprecise, or set-valued, assessment I on a family of conditional events F is a (possibly empty) set of precise assessments P on F .
Definition 2 states that an imprecise (probability) assessment I on a sequence of n conditional events F is just a (possibly empty) subset of r0, 1s n ( [25, 27, 28] ). For instance, think about an agent (like Pythagoras) who considers only rational numbers to evaluate the probability of an event E|H. Pythagoras' evaluation can be represented by the imprecise assessment I " r0, 1s X Q on E|H. Moreover, a constraint like ppE|Hq ą 0 can be represented by the imprecise assessment I "s0, 1s on E|H.
Given an imprecise assessment I we denote by s I the complementary imprecise assessment of I, i.e. s I " r0, 1s n zI. We now recall the notions of g-coherence and total coherence in the general case of imprecise (in the sense of set-valued) probability assessments [28] .
Definition 3 (g-coherence). Given a sequence of n conditional events F . An imprecise assessment I Ď r0, 1s n on F is g-coherent iff there exists a coherent precise assessment P on F such that P P I.
Definition 4 (t-coherence). An imprecise assessment I on F is totally coherent (t-coherent) iff the following two conditions are satisfied: (i) I is non-empty; (ii) if P P I, then P is a coherent precise assessment on F .
Definition 5 (t-coherent part). Given a sequence of n conditional events F . Let Π be the set of all coherent assessments on F . We denote by π : ℘pr0, 1s n q Ñ ℘pΠq the function defined by πpIq " Π X I, for any imprecise assessment I P ℘pr0, 1s n q. Moreover, for each subset I P ℘pr0, 1s n q we call πpIq the t-coherent part of I.
Of course, if πpIq ‰ H, then I is g-coherent and πpIq is t-coherent.
From Imprecise Assessments to the Square of Opposition
In this section we consider imprecise assessments on a given sequence F of n conditional events. In our approach, a sentence s is a pair pF , Iq, where I Ď r0, 1s
n is an imprecise assessment on F . We introduce the following equivalence relation under t-coherence: Definition 6. Given two sentences s 1 : pF , I 1 q and s 2 : pF , I 2 q, s 1 and s 2 are equivalent (under t-coherence), denoted by s 1 " s 2 , iff πpI 1 q " πpI 2 q. Definition 7. Given three sentences s : pF , Iq, s 1 : pF , I 1 q, and s 2 : pF , I 2 q. We define:
Iq, where s I " r0, 1s n zI (negation).
Remark 1.
As the basic operations among sentences are defined by settheoretical operations, they inherit the corresponding properties (including associativity, commutativity, De Morgan's law, etc.). Moreover, as πpI 1 X I 2 q " πpI 1 q X πpI 2 q, by setting s1 " pF , πpI 1 qq, s2 " pF , πpI 2and ps 1ŝ
As we interpret the basic sentence types involved in the square of opposition by imprecise probability assessments on sequences of conditional events, we will introduce the following notion of acceptability, which serves as a semantic bridge between basic sentence types and imprecise assessments: Definition 8. A sentence s : pF , Iq is (resp., is not) acceptable iff the assessment I on F is (resp., is not) g-coherent, i.e. πpIq is not (resp., is) empty. Based on the relations given in Definition 9 we define a square of opposition as follows.
Definition 10. Let s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4, be four sentences. We call the ordered quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q a square of opposition (under coherence), iff the following relations among the four sentences hold: (a) s 1 and s 2 are contraries, i.e., πpI 1 q X πpI 2 q " H; (b) s 3 and s 4 are subcontraries, i.e., πpI 3 q Y πpI 4 q " Π; (c) s 1 and s 4 are contradictories, i.e., πpI 1 q X πpI 4 q " H and πpI 1 q Y πpI 4 q " Π; s 2 and s 3 are contradictories, i.e., πpI 2 q X πpI 3 q " H and πpI 2 q Y πpI 3 q " Π;
is a subaltern of s 1 , i.e., πpI 1 q Ď πpI 3 q; s 4 is a subaltern of s 2 , i.e., πpI 2 q Ď πpI 4 q. square of opposition, it is necessary and sufficient to check that the quadruple ps 
Theorem 1. Given any sequence of n conditional events F and a quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q of sentences, with s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4. Define D 1 " πpI 1 q, D 2 " πpI 2 q, and D 3 " πpI 3 q X πpI 4 q. Then, the quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q is a square of opposition if and only if pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q is a tripartition of (the non-empty set) Π such that:
Proof. pñq. We assume that D 1 " πpI 1 q, D 2 " πpI 2 q, and D 3 " πpI 3 q X πpI 4 q. Of course, D i Ď Π, i " 1, 2, 3. We now prove that:
piq From condition (a) in Definition 10, as s 1 and s 2 are contraries, it follows that D 1 X D 2 " H. piiq We first prove that
This trivially follows when D 3 " H. If D 3 ‰ H, then let x P D 3 " πpI 3 q X πpI 4 q. As x P πpI 3 q, from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x R πpI 2 q. Likewise, as x P πpI 4 q, from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x R πpI 1 q. Then, x P Π and x R pπpI 1 qYπpI 2 qq, that is
. As x P ΠzπpI 1 q, from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x P πpI 4 q. Likewise, as x P ΠzπpI 2 q from condition (c) in Definition 10, we obtain x P πpI 3 q. Then, x P pπpI 3 q X πpI 4" D 3 . Therefore pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q is a tripartition of Π. By our assumption, πpI 1 q " D 1 and πpI 2 q " D 2 . We observe that πpI 3 q X D 3 " D 3 ; moreover, from conditions (c) and (d), we obtain πpI 3 q X D 2 " πpI 3 q X πpI 2 q " H and
Likewise, we observe that πpI 4 qXD 3 " D 3 ; moreover, from conditions (c),(d) in Definition 10, we obtain
we prove that the quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q satisfies conditions (a), (b), (c), and (d) in Definition 10. We observe that πpI 1 q X πpI 2 q " D 1 X D 2 " H, which coincides with (a). Condition (b) is satisfied because πpI 3 q Y πpI 4 q "
A method to construct a square of opposition by starting from a tripartition of Π is given in the following result (see also [20] ). Corollary 1. Given any sequence of n conditional events F and a tripartition pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q of Π, then the quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q, with s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4 and πpI 1 q "
is a square of opposition.
Proof. The proof immediately follows by observing πpI 3 q X πpI 4 q " D 3 and by the (ð) side proof of Theorem 1.
The following result allows to construct a square of opposition by starting from a tripartition of the whole set r0, 1s n :
Corollary
Then, by applying Corollary 1 we obtain that ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q is a square of opposition.
Traditionally the square of opposition can be constructed based on the fragmented square of opposition which requires only the contrariety and contradiction relations (which goes back to Aristotle's De Interpretatione 6-7, 17b.17-26, see [38, Section 2] ). This result also holds in our framework: Theorem 2. The quadruple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q of sentences, with s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4, is a square of opposition iff relations (a) and (c) in Definition 10 are satisfied.
Proof. pñq It follows directly from Definition 10. pðq We prove that (d) and (b) in Definition 10 follow from (a) and (c). If πpI 1 q " H, then of course πpI 1 q Ď πpI 3 q. If πpI 1 q ‰ H, let x P πpI 1 q Ď Π, from (a) it follows that x R πpI 2 q, and since (c) requires πpI 2 q Y πpI 3 q " Π, we obtain x P πpI 3 q. Thus, πpI 1 q Ď πpI 3 q; likewise, πpI 2 q Ď πpI 4 q. Therefore, (d) is satisfied. Now we prove that (b) is satisfied, i.e. πpI 3 q Y πpI 4 q " Π. Of course, πpI 3 q Y πpI 4 q Ď Π. Let x P Π. If x R πpI 3 q, then, x P πpI 2 q from (c). Moreover, from (d), x P πpI 4 q. Then, Π Ď πpI 3 q Y πpI 4 q. Therefore, (b) is satisfied. 
Square of Opposition and Generalized Quantifiers
Let F be a conditional event P |S (where S ‰ K) and pB 1 pxq, B 2 pxq, B 3 pxqq be a tripartition of r0, 1s, where B 1 pxq " rx, 1s, B 2 pxq " r0, 1´xs, B 3 pxq " s1´x, xr and x Ps , 1s (see Figure 2) . Consider the quadruple of sentences pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, with Apxq : pP |S, I Apxq q, Epxq : pP |S, I Epxq q, Ipxq : pP |S, I Ipxq q, Opxq : pP |S, I Opxq q, where I Apxq " B 1 pxq " rx, 1s, I Epxq " B 2 pxq " r0, 1´xs, I Ipxq " B 1 pxq Y B 3 pxq "s1´x, 1s, and I Opxq " B 2 pxq Y B 3 pxq " r0, xr. By applying Corollary 2 with ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 q " pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, it follows that pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq is a square of opposition for any x Ps , 1s (see Figure 3 ). We recall that in presence of some logical relations between P and S the set Π could be a strict subset of r0, 1s. In particular, we have the following three cases (see, [29, 30] ): (i) if P^S ‰ K and P^S ‰ S, then Π " r0, 1s; (ii) if P^S " S, then Π " t1u; (iii) if P^S " K, then Π " t0u. The quadruple pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq, with the threshold 1 2 ă x ď 1, is a square of opposition in each of the three cases. In particular we obtain: case (i) πpI Apx" I Apxq , πpI Epx" I Epxq ,πpI Ipx" I Ipxq , and πpI Opx" I Opxq ; case (ii): πpI Apx" t1u, πpI Epx" H,πpI Ipx" t1u, and πpI Opx" H; case (iii): πpI Apx" H, πpI Epx" t1u,πpI Ipx" H, and πpI Opx" t1u. We note that in cases (ii) and (iii) we obtain degenerated squares each, where-apart from the contradictory relations-all relations are strengthened. Specifically, both contrary and the subcontrary become contradictory Table 1 ). It provides a new interpretation of the traditional square of opposition (see, e.g., [38] ), where the corners are labeled by "Every S is P " (A), "No S is P " (E), "Some S is P " (I), and "Some S is not P " (O).
relations. Moreover, both subalternation relations become symmetric. As by coherence ppP |Sq`pp s P |Sq " 1, a sentence s : pP |S, Iq is equivalent to the sentence s 1 : p s P |S, s Iq, where s I " r0, 1szI. Table 1 presents generalization of basic sentence types Apxq, Epxq, Ipxq, and Opxq involving generalized quantifiers Q. The generalized quantifiers are defined on a threshold x ą 1 2 . The value of the threshold may be context dependent and provides lots of flexibility for modeling various instances of generalized quantifiers (like "most", "almost all").
Given two thresholds x 1 and x 2 , with 1 2 ă x 2 ă x 1 ď 1, we analyze the relations among the same sentence types in the two squares of opposition Spx 1 q and Spx 2 q, with Spx i q " pApx i q, Epx i q, Ipx i q, Opx i qq, i " 1, 2. It can be easily proved that: Apx 2 q is a subaltern of Apx 1 q, Epx 2 q is a subaltern of Sentence Probability constraints Assessment on P |S Apxq : pQ ěx S are P ) ppP |Sq ě x I Apxq " rx, 1s Epxq : pQ ěx S are not P ) pp s P |Sq ě x I Epxq " r0, 1´xs Ipxq : (Q ą1´x S are P ) ppP |Sq ą 1´x I Ipxq "s1´x, 1s Opxq : (Q ą1´x S are not P ) pp s P |Sq ą 1´x I Opxq " r0, xr Ap1q : (Every S is P ) ppP |Sq " 1
ppP |Sq ą 0 I I "s0, 1s Op1q : (Some S is not P ) pp s P |Sq ą 0 I O " r0, 1r Table 1 : Probabilistic interpretation of the sentence types A, E, I, and O involving generalized quantifiers Q defined by a threshold x (with x Ps 1 2 , 1s) on the subject S and predicate P and the respective imprecise probabilistic assessments I Apxq , I Epxq , I Ipxq , and I Opxq on the conditional event P |S (above). When x " 1, we obtain our probabilistic interpretation of the traditional sentence types A, E, I, and O (below).
Epx 1 q, Ipx 1 q is a subaltern of Ipx 2 q, and Opx 1 q is a subaltern of Opx 2 q. In the extreme case x " 1 we obtain the probabilistic interpretation under coherence of the basic sentence types involved in the traditional square of opposition pA, E, I, Oq (see [27, 28] for the default square of opposition, involving defaults and negated defaults).
In agreement with De Morgan (as pointed out by [20] ) by the quadruple pa, e, i, oq we denotes the square of opposition obtained from pA, E, I, Oq when the events P and S are replaced by s P and s S, respectively. Specifically, a : p s P | s S, t1uq, e : p s P | s S, t0uq, i : p s P | s S, s0, 1sq, and o : p s P | s S, r0, 1rq. In the general case when P and S are logically independent it can be proved that the set of all coherent assessments on pP |S, s P | s Sq is the square r0, 1s
2 (see e.g. [17] ; see also [14, Proposition 1] [15, Theorem 4]). Thus, in the general case there are no relations between any two sentences s 1 and s 2 , where s 1 P tA, E, I, Ou and s 2 P ta, e, i, ou. Therefore, the two squares pA, E, I, Oq and pa, e, i, oq do not form a cube of opposition (with these two squares as opposite facing sides).
Hexagon of Opposition
Compared to the millennia long history of investigations on the square of opposition, the hexagon of opposition was discovered fairly recently, namely in the 1950ies. The hexagon generalizes the square by adding the disjunction of the top vertices of the square to build a new vertex at the top and by adding the conjunction of the bottom vertices of the square to build a new vertex at the bottom. According to Béziau ( [2] ), the hexagon of opposition was introduced by the French priest and logician Augustin Sesmat ([48] ) and by the philosopher Robert Blanché ( [7] ), who worked out the full structure of the hexagon of opposition (for his main work on the hexagon of opposition see [8] ). Jaspers and Seuren ( [33] ) trace the history of the hexagon back also to the American philosopher Paul Jacoby ([32] , see also [20] ). In this section we will use the tools developed in Section 3, to construct a hexagon of opposition by starting from a square of opposition. More precisely, given a traditional square of opposition pA, E, I, Oq, by setting U " A_ E, Y " I^O, the tuple pA, E, I, O, U, Y q defines a hexagon of opposition. Accordingly, we define the (probabilistic) hexagon of opposition in our approach as follows:
Definition 12 (Hexagon of opposition). Let s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, be six sentences. We call the ordered tuple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 q a hexagon of opposition (under coherence), if and only if the following relations among the six sentences hold: Figure 4 shows the probabilistic hexagon of opposition as given by Definition 12.
Theorem 3. Let s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, be six sentences. We now consider relations among a tripartition of the set of all coherent assessments Π and a hexagon of opposition.
Remark 6. Given a hexagon of opposition ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 q, we observe that the sentence s 6 " s 3^s4 represents the pair pF , I 6 q, where I 6 " I 3 X I 4 . Moreover, by Remark 1, πpI 6 q " πpI 3 X I 4 q " πpI 3 q X πpI 4 q. Therefore, based on Theorem 1, the triple pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q, where D 1 " πpI 1 q, D 2 " πpI 2 q, and D 3 " πpI 6 q, is a tripartition of Π. Conversely, based on Corollary 1, given a tripartition pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q of Π, the sequence ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 q where
, and πpI 6 q " D 3 , is a hexagon of opposition (see also [11, 20, 21] ).
Next, we consider relations among a tripartition of r0, 1s
n and a hexagon of opposition.
Remark 7.
Based on Corollary 2, we can also construct a hexagon of opposition by starting from a tripartition of the whole set r0, 1s
n . Specifically, given a tripartition pB 1 , B 2 , B 3 q of r0, 1s n , let
, and I 6 " B 3 . For any sequence of n conditional events F , the tuple ps 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 , s 5 , s 6 q, where s k : pF , I k q, k " 1, . . . , 6, is a hexagon of opposition. 
Figure 4 illustrates all the relations in the hexagon of opposition described in Theorem 4. This figure also shows the two triangles T 1 : ps 1 , s 2 , s 6 q and T 2 : ps 3 , s 4 , s 5 q. We note that the sides of T 1 consist of contrary relations, whereas the sides of T 2 consist of subcontrary relations. Moreover, the coherent part of the imprecise assessments defined by sentences in T 1 (i.e., D 1 " πpI 1 q, D 2 " πpI 2 q and D 3 " πpI 6 q) forms a tripartition pD 1 , D 2 , D 3 q of Π. Whereas, the imprecise assessments defined by sentences in T 2 are such that πpI 3 q "
By basing the hexagon of opposition on the square of opposition pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxqq (as introduced in Section 4) we obtain the following hexagon of opposition: pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq with x Ps1{2, 1s, where Upxq denotes Apxq _ Epxq and Y pxq denotes Ipxq^Opxq (see Table 2 ). Figure 5 illustrates the hexagon pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq with x Ps1{2, 1s.
We now consider a generalization of the hexagon of opposition pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq by considering n conditional events. In particular, let F " pP 1 |S 1 , . . . , P n |S n q be a sequence of n conditional events. Exploiting Remark 7, we construct a hexagon of opposition by considering the following tripartition of r0, 1s n : pB 1 pxq, B 2 pxq, B 3 pxqq, with x Ps1{2, 1s, where B 1 pxq " tpp 1 , . . . , p n q P r0, 1s n : ř n i"1 p i n ě xu, B 2 pxq " tpp 1 , . . . , p n q P r0, 1s n :
We obtain the following (generalized) hexagon of opposition pApxq, Epxq, Ipxq, Opxq, Upxq, Y pxqq, with the quantified statements Epxq : ppP |Sq ď 1´x
Upxq : ppP |Sq P r0, 1´xs Y rx, 1s
Apxq : ppP |Sq ě x Ipxq : ppP |Sq ą 1´x
Y pxq : 1´x ă ppP |Sq ă x Opxq : ppP |Sq ă x Table 1 ). It provides a new interpretation of the hexagon of opposition, which we compose of the probabilistic square of opposition and the two additional vertices U pxq (i.e., Apxq _ Epxq; top) and Y pxq (i.e., Ipxq^Opxq; bottom). For the meaning of the lines see Figure 1 .
Sentence
Probability constr. Assessment on P |S Upxq : Apxq _ Epxq ppP |Sq ě x or pp s P |Sq ě x I U pxq " r0, 1´xs Y rx, 1s
Y pxq : Ipxq^Opxq " ppP |Sq ą 1´x pp s P |Sq ą 1´x I Y pxq "s1´x, xr
Up1q :
Every S is P or No S is P ppP |Sq " 1 or pp s P |Sq " 1
Some S is P and Some S is s P " ppP |Sq ą 0 pp s P |Sq ą 0 I Y "s0, 1r Table 2 : Probabilistic interpretation of the sentence types at the top (U ) and at the bottom (Y ) of the hexagon of opposition involving generalized quantifiers Q defined by a threshold x (with x Ps 1 2 , 1s) on the subject S and predicate P and the respective imprecise probabilistic assessments I Upxq , and I Y pxq on the conditional event P |S (above). When x " 1, we obtain our probabilistic interpretation of the traditional sentence types U , Y .
Apxq : pF , I Apxq q, Epxq : pF , I Epxq q, Ipxq : pF , I Ipxq q, Opxq : pF , I Opxq q, Upxq : pF , I U pxq q, Y pxq : pF , I Y pxq q, where I Apxq " B 1 pxq, I Epxq " B 2 pxq, I Y pxq " B 3 pxq, I Ipxq " B 1 pxq Y B 3 pxq " tpp 1 , . . . , p n q P r0, 1s n : ř n i"1 p i n ą 1´xu, I Opxq " B 2 pxq Y B 3 pxq " tpp 1 , . . . , p n q P r0, 1s n : ř n i"1 p i n ă xu, I U pxq " B 1 pxq Y B 2 pxq " tpp 1 , . . . , p n q P r0, 1s n : ř n i"1 p i n ě x or ř n i"1 p i n ď 1´xu.
Concluding Remarks
Finally, we note that conditional probability interpretations of quantified statements were also proposed in psychology (see, e.g., [12, 13, 37, 39, 41, 43, 46] ), since generalized quantifiers are psychologically much more plausible compared to the traditional logical quantifiers, as the latter are either too strict (@ does not allow for exceptions) or too weak (D quantifies over at least one object) for formalizing everyday life sentences. Recent experimental data suggests that people negate conditionals and quantified statements mainly by building contraries (in the sense of inferring pp C|Aq " 1´x from the negated ppC|Aq " x) but hardly ever by building contradictories (in the sense of inferring ppC|Aq ă x from the negated ppC|Aq " x; see [40, 46] ). However, this empirical result calls for further experiments. The square presented in Section 4 and the hexagon presented in Section 5 can serve as a new rationality framework for formal-normative and psychological investigations of basic relations among quantified statements.
